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NOTES
THE LAST Ct.EAR CHANCE DOCTRINE
Negligence has long since been recognized as a ground of liabil-
ity.' Contributory negligence has long since been recognized as a
ground of defense.2 It has been more recently held that even though
there was negligence on the part of the defendant, and contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, nevertheless, the plaintiff may
recover if the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury3
However, in each of the above cases neither negligence, nor con-
tributory negligence, nor the last clear chance will be a ground of
liability, or defense, unless it was proximate to the injury4
It seems that the doctrine of the last clear chance was first
embodied in the common law in the case of Davies v. Mann. In
that case the plaintiff fettered his donkey, and turned it on the public
highway. The highway was about eight yards wide, and the donkey
was on the off side grazing at the time of the accident. The de-
fendant's servant was negligently driving his team to a wagon, at
a smartish pace, down a slight descent, and hit the donkey causing
its death. It was proved that the driver was some distance behind
the horses. The judge charged the jury that though the plaintiff
was negligent in leaving the donkey fettered on the highway, they
should find for the plaintiff if the driver could, by the use of due
care, have avoided the injury. The defendant moved for a new trial
on the ground of misdirection, and insisted that the donkey would
not have been injured, but for the negligence in leavihg it fettered
on the highway, and that this negligence should bar any recovery.
Held, that though the plaintiff was negligent in leaving his donkey
fettered on the highway, in a place of danger, this negligence would
not excuse the defendant where he had the last clear chance to avoid
the injury. The doctrine of this case seems to have first been
adopted by the North Carolina Court in the case of Gunter v.
Wicker.6 There the plaintiff was employed at the defendant's saw-
mill, one of his duties being to oil the machinery. When the engine
1 Weaver v. Ward (1616) Hobart 134.
'Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 11 East 60.
'Davies v. Mann (1842) 10 M. & W. 546.
'Farmer v. Railroad (1883) 88 N. C. 564.
'Note 3, supra.
' Gunter v. Wicker (1881) 85 N. C. 310.
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was stopped he entered the flywheel to oil it, and while there, the
defendant turned on the steam causing injuries to the plaintiff. It
was shown that if the plaintiff had put the engine on dead center,
there would have been no injury. It was also shown that the
plaintiff would have suffered no injury had the steam not been turned
on until after he retired from his position. Held, that the doctrine
of Davies v. Mann was applicable to this case. No matter how
negligent the plaintiff may have been in getting into a position of
danger, no harm would have come to him, but for the negligence of
the defendant in turning on the steam without noticing to see if the
plaintiff had retired from the flywheel. The cases are obviously
correct. The defendant should not be allowed to take advantage of
the plaintiff's negligence in order to do him an injury; nor should
the plaintiff's negligence excuse the defendant in acting negligently
when the use of due care on his part would avoid injury. The
defendant is not being held liable for the plaintiff's negligence, but
for his own.
This doctrine of last clear chance, originating in Davies v. Mann
and adopted in North Carolina in the case of Gunter v. Wicker, has
been applied by the North Carolina Court in a variety of cases, most
of them involving injuries by railroads: (1) in cases where a per-
son is lying on the railroad track in an apparently helpless condition;
(2) in cases where a person is on the railroad track in apparent
possession of his faculties, but is in such a situation that escape
would be practically impossible; (3) in cases where a person is in
apparent possession of his faculties, and not in a situation where
escape would be difficult, but is apparently so absorbed that it should
be apparent to the engineer that he will not escape; (4) in cases
where a person is in apparent possession of his faculties, and is so
absorbed in what he is doing that he will not escape, but this absorb-
tion is not apparent to the engineer.
(1) Cases where a person is on the railroad track in an appar-
entiy helpless condition. In the case of Pickett v. Railroad7 the
plaintiff's intestate was lying on the defendant's railroad track
apparently asleep, and was run over and killed. The facts show that
the train was running about forty-five miles per hour; that the
engineer could have seen the intestate from a distance of approxi-
mately five hundred yards; but there was no evidence that the engi-
'Pickett v. Railroad (1895) 117 N. C. 616, 23 S.'E. 264.
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neer did see him from that distance. The defendant asked for a
charge that it would not be liable unless the engineer failed to use
due care after discovering the peril, where it was shown that the
plaintiff's intestate deliberately went on the track and fell asleep.
Held, that it was not error to refuse this charge. The rule of Gunter
v. Wicker was approved. Though the intestate was negligent in
going to sleep on the track, this does not excuse the negligence of
the engineer in failing to keep a proper lookout, when the engineer
by keeping a proper lookout could have avoided the injury.8
(2) Cases where a person is in apparent possession of his facul-
ties, but is in such a situation that escape would be practically impos-
sible. In the case of McLazb v. Railroad9 the plaintiff's intestate
was on the defendant's railroad trestle which was about thirty feet
high and four hundred feet long. The engineer gave a signal when
about two hundred yards from the trestle, but didn't slacken speed.
The plaintiff's intestate seemed to be in a very confused state of
mind and was running across the track when hit and killed by the
train. The jury found negligence on the part of the defendant, and
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff; they also found
that the defendant had the last clear chance to prevent the accident
despite the defendant's claim that he thought the intestate could get
to a place of safety on the siding. Defendant appealed. Held, that
the engineer should have given the intestate the benefit of the doubt,
and his failure to avail himself of the last clear chance, such failure
causing the intestate's death, entitles the plaintiff to recover. 10
(3) Cases where a person is in apparent possession of his facul-
ties, but is apparently so absorbed that it should be apparent to the
engineer that he will not escape. In the case of Lassiter v. Rail-
road"L a conductor of a freight train who was standing between the
main track and a side track directing men who were on a box car,
stepped back on the side track in front of a shifting engine which
was coming up at the rate of about four miles per hour, and was
killed. The engineer of the shifting engine was unable to see the
'Accord, Brown v. Railroad (1916) 172 N. C. 604, 90 S. E. 783. The
plaintiff's intestate was killed by defendant's train while lying on the track
apparently drunk. The defendant could have discovered the peril, by the use
of due care, but negligently failed to do so.. Held, that as the defendant had
the last clear chance and could have avoided the killing despite the plaintiff's
intestate's negligence, it is liable in damages to the plaintiff.
'McLamnb v. Railroad (1898) 122 N. C. 862, 29 S. E. 894.10Accord, Hopkins v. Railroad (1915) 170 N. C. 486, 87 S. E. 320.
'
1 Lassiter v. Railroad (1903) 133 N. C. 244, 45 S. E. 570.
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intestate, as the engine was pushing a box car in front of it, cutting
off the view; but if there had been someone to keep a lookout, the
injury could have been avoided. Held, that the defendant was
liable in damages, for if it had been keeping a lookout, the absorb-
tion of the intestate in his business would have been discovered, and
his death prevented. The fact that the defendant didn't know of its
last clear chance is not a defense.' 2
(4) Cases where a person is in apparent possession of his facul-
ties, and is" absorbed in what he is doing, and he will not escape; but
this absorption is not apparent. In the case of Beach v. Railroad'3
the plaintiff's intestate was walking along on the defendant's track
looking at a stationary engine which was making a noise so he was
unable to hear the approaching train, but it appeared to the engineer
that he was alert and would step off the track before the train would
hit him. After it was discovered that the intestate didn't know of
the peril, the engineer tried to avert the accident, but was too late to
stop, or give the intestate warning. Held, that there should be no
liability as it was not possible for the engineer to have discovered
the intestate's true situation, and otherwise he would expect the
intestate to step off the track and was not obliged to slacken the
speed of the train.14
Thus, where a person is on the track in an apparently helpless
condition, or where he is in apparent possission of his faculties but
is in such a situation that escape is practically impossible, or where
a person is in apparent possession of his faculties but is apparently
so absorbed that it should be apparent that he will not escape, the
defendant is held liable despite the negligence of the injured person
if it is shown that it had the last clear chance to avoid the injury
and negligently failed to avail itself of such chance.
Miscellaneous Cases-In the case of Wheeler v. Gibbon,15 the
plaintiff, starting to cross a street during a storm, looked up the
street from whence the storm came, and saw no one coming, pulled
' Accord, Moore v. Railroad (1923) 185 N. C. 189, 119 S. E. 357. The
plaintiff's intestate, a brakeman, who was standing on the end of the cross ties
checking off the cars that passed, being absorbed in his business didn't see the
train and was hit and killed by the defendant's train. The engineer could
have seen him, as he had a clear view, in time to stop but he didn't slacken
the speed of the train. Held liable.
"Beach v. Railroad (1908) 148 N. C. 153, 61 S. E. 664.
"Accord, McAdoo v. Railroad (1890) 105 N. C. 142, 11 S. E. 316; Davis v.
Railroad (1923) 187 N. C. 147, 120 S. E. 827.
Wheeler v. Gibbon (1900) 126 N. C. 811, 36 S. E. 277.
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the umbrella over his head and went on the street, negligently failing
to look any more. The defendant, coming from the same direction
as the rain, in a closed buggy, negligently ran against the plaintiff
causing injuries to him. It was found by the jury that the defendant
had the last clear chance to avoid the injury, and failed to avail him-
self of it. Held, that it was proper to put the question of last clear
chance to the jury, and that its finding would be sustained.
In the case of Ingle v. Asheville Power Co.,16 the plaintiff's intes-
tate started across the street car track diagonally with a peck of
peaches, interested in selling them to a buyer across the street, and
paying no attention to the approaching street car, which hit and killed
him. The motorman was looking back over his shoulder, and didn't
see the intestate. It was shown that if he had been using due care in
keeping a lookout, he could have discovered the intestate and pre-
vented his death. Held, that the defendant could have prevented the
death notwithstanding the intestate's negligence, and as the motor-
man did not avail himself of the last clear chance, it is liable.
In Smith v. St. Railway,17 the plaintiff's intestate was sitting on
the track, bent over apparently asleep. The motorman of the street
car could have easily discovered the intestate's condition in time to
avoid running over him, but he testified that he didn't see the inte-
state until it was too late to stop before hitting him. Held, that
where it is shown that the plaintiff's intestate was negligent, but that
the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury and failed
to do so, the plaintiff may recover.
In Farmer v. Railroad,'8 the plaintiff's mule was turned out of
the lot, which was about fifty steps from the track, to go to the well
across the track to get water. The engineer saw the mule in plenty
of time to stop the train, but thinking the mule would get out of
danger did not slacken the speed of the train so as to have it under
control, and hit the mule causing its death. Held, that the engineer
should have-been aware that the mul2 would likely not get off the
track, and it was negligence in his not having the train under con-
trol so as to be able to avoid the peril, and the injuries caused by
such conduct entitles the plaintiff to recover.
"Ingle v. Asheville Power Co. (1916) 172 N. C. 751, 90 S. E. 953.
" Smith v. St. Railway (1913) 162 N. C. 29, 77 S. E. 966.
'Farmer v. Railroad (1883) 88 N. C. 564.
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The North Carolina Court holds a defendant liable not only
where he has the last clear chance and knows of it,19 but where he
has the last clear chance and doesn't know of it, but would have
known of it, if he had not been negligent. In the case of Goff v.
Railroad,20 the plaintiff's intestate drove his automobile on the de-
fendant's track, at a crossing, without looking to see if the train
was coming. The engineer wasn't keeping a lookout. The train
struck the automobile and carried it down the track two or three
hundred yards where the automobile hit a switch-post and hurled
the intestate to his death. It was shown that the train could have
'een stopped, after it hit the automobile, before it got to the switch-
post; but, strange as it may seem, the engineer didn't know he was
,carrying the automobile until it had hit the switch-post, and didn't
slacken speed. Held that though the engineer didn't know of the
-accident until after the intestate was killed, he, in fact, had the last
clear chance, and his negligence in failing to use it was the cause of
the intestate's death.21
It seems that one of the most difficult problems in the application
of the last clear chance doctrine which the trial court has is its proper
presentation to the jury. The doctrine of the last clear chance is
primarily a secondary issue and should never be raised until it has
been shown that the plaintiff has suffered injuries by the negligence
of the defendant, and the defendant has shown that the plaintiff has
been guilty of contributory negligence; then if it appears that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury, it should be
-given to the jury to determine. 22 And in presenting the question to
the jury the instruction as to the burden of proof is frequently given
erroneously. In an action for damages, by a plaintiff, for injuries
received because of the negligence of the defendant, the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to show that his injury was caused by the
-negligence of the defendant. After the plaintiff has shown that the
-negligence of the defendant was the cause of his injury, if the de-
fendant wishes to plead contibutory negligence as a defense, the
burden is on him to show that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence.23 After the defendant has shown the contributory negli-
"Roberts v. Railroad (1883) 88 N. C. 561; Note 9, supra.
"Goff v. Railroad (1920) 179 N. C. 216, 102 S. E. 320.
Note 16, supra.
Curtiss v. Railroad (1902) 130 N. C. 437. 41 S. E. 929.
"C. S. 523.
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gence of the plaintiff, and it is a case to which the last clear chance
doctrine is applicable, and the plaintiff wishes to take advantage of
it, the burden is on him to show that the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the injury to him, notwithstanding his own
contributory negligence. 24
M. P. MYERS.
EFFECT OF PARTIAL INVALIDITY OF STATUTE
The decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in the recent
case of State v. Barkley' is interesting not only to those who wish to
hunt or fish, because it removes all discriminations between citizens
of the State in favor of local hunters as to license fees, but the case
also merits comment as to the ingenious method by which the court
arrived at its decision upholding part of the Act in question.
The provisions of the statute, section 7, subsections (a) and (b),
ch. 573-Public Local Laws 1925, under which the defendant was
indicted, pertinent to this discussion, are as follows:
"(a) All persons who shall hunt with a gun, and who shall have
been a resident of Cabarrus county for three months, and who shall
be sixteen years of age or over, shall, before entering any field for
the purposes of hunting any wild bird or animal, be required to pro-
cure a hunter's license from the game warden or other officer or per-
son authorized to issue said license, and, for said license the person
procuring same shall pay to the person issuing such license the sum
of one dollar, and -the license so issued shall be good for one year
from the first day of May of the year in which it is issued."
"(b) All persons living in another county, and who shall be six-
teen years of age or over, shall pay the sum of three dollars for a
hunter's license in Cabarrus county, which shall be good for one year
from the first day of May of the year in which it is issued."
The defendant, a resident of Mecklenburg county, was prosecuted
under the Act for hunting in Cabarrus county without having paid
the three dollar fee or having secured the license.
From a judgment entered upon a special verdict finding defendant
not guilty the State appealed, under C. S. 4649. The Supreme Court
held that subsection (b) was an arbitrary discrimination against per-
sons living in another county and held it to be unconstitutional and
"Hudson v. Railroad (1926) 190 N. C. 116, 129 S. E. 146.
'State v. Barkley (1926) 192 N. C. 184, 134 S. E. 454.
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void in toto. But after subsection (b) was thus stricken out, the
court found that subsection (a) referred only to the required fee of
one dollar which, by the terms of the subsection, was imposed only
on residents of Cabarrus county of three months standing and, if
left as enacted, would require residents of the county to pay one
dollar and non-residents nothing. This obviously made subsection
(a), as enacted, discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. How-
ever, instead of striking the whole of subsection (a), as was done
when subsection (b) was found to so offend, the court in an en-
deavor to carry out the supposed legislative intent and to support the
presumption of validity of the statute, struck from subsection (a)
only the clause "and who shall have been a resident of Cabarrus
county for three months." Under the remainder of the paragraph,
after thus being operated on, the court held that, all discriminations
being removed, the minimum license tax of one dollar was left to
apply uniformly to all the residents of the State.
In addition to relying on the presumption that the General As-
sembly intended a valid constitutional enactment, the court leans
heavily upon section 20 of the Act in question which provides, "If
any clause, sentence, paragraph or other part of this Act shall for
any reason be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to be
invalid, it shall in no way affect or impair the remainder of said Act.
Such "saving clauses" as the above section 20 are generally held
to be applicable only where the offending portion of the statute may
be eliminated without affecting the general application of the re-
mainder. Such is the case where the valid and invalid parts are
clearly and obviously separable and independent as in Keith v. Lock-
hart,2 where one chapter of the Act provided for the establishment
of a free-range by vote of the people in Pender county and another
chapter provided for a special tax to pay the cv't of a line fence
between Pender and adjoining counties, with a proviso exempting
from payment of the tax certain localities within the county. The
court held the valid chapter establishing the free range policy dis-
tinct and severable from the invalid chapter providing for the special
tax. Not so where they are indivisible and dependent one upon an-
other. In the same case, the court refused to strike out the invalid
proviso exempting certain localities and allow the special tax to apply
'Keith v. Lockhart (1916) 171 N. C. 451, 88 S. E. 640, Ann. Cas. 1918 D
916.
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uniformly throughout the county. The same was true in the Em-
ployers Liability Cases3 where the court held that the parts of the
Act referring to the regulation of interstate commerce by Congress,
while valid in themselves, were so blended with the parts relating to
subjects over which Congress had no power as to be indivisible and
therefore the whole Act was unconstitutional.
If the striking out of one clause and retaining the remainder does
change the application of the remainder of the Act, it must be clear
that the legislature would have desired this result.4
The vice in the present act is the discrimination created by setting
up two independent classes of persons in two independent para-
graphs, each being complete in itself and each imposing a different
fee on its respective class. The court, to avoid the unconstitution-
ality and discrimination and yet preserve a part of the Act eliminates
one entire paragraph which applied to one class (non-residents), and
reconstructs the paragraph creating the other class (residents) by
striking out the clause which specifies such other class (residents)
so as to allow the emasculated paragraph to apply to both classes.
Conceding the desirability of this plastic surgery upon a wounded
statute, is it reconcilable with the theory of separation of legislative
and judicial powers? The difficulties are suggested by the following
questions:
How does the court know that the General Assembly would not
have preferred to impose no tax at all if it could not discriminate?
How does the court know that the General Assembly would prefer
to impose the one dollar tax on all rather than the three dollar tax?
Why eliminate the whole of subsection (b) and seize upon the clause
pertaining to residents of Cabarrus county in subsection (a) for
deletion? Why not, rather, wipe out subsection (a) in toto, amputate
the clause in subsection (b) referring to all persons living in another
county, and thus leave the three dollar tax to apply uniformly to all
residents of the state? In what way does subsection (b) constitute
any more of a discrimination against all persons living in another
county, than subsection (a) constitutes a conferring of exclusive
'Employers Liability Cases (1908), 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141, 54
L. Ed. 297.
'Pollock v. FarmerZ' Loan and Trust Co. (1895) 158 U. S. 601, 635-637,
15 Sup. Ct. 912, 39 L. Ed. 1108; Poindexter v. Greenhow (1885) 114 U. S. 270,
304, 5 Sup. Ct. 903, 962; Spraigue v. Thompson (1886) 118 U. S. 90, 95, 6
Sup. Ct. 988.
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or separate privileges upon the residents of Cabarrus county contrary
to the state constitution? (Art. I, sec. 7).
The general trend, in cases involving analogous problems seems
toward a reluctance to decide such uncertain and doubtful questions,
and toward a preference rather to strike out the whole statute as
unconstitutional. 5 In State v. Mitchell6 it was held that a statute
undertaking to exact a license from all hawkers and peddlers, but to
exempt all residents of the town who pay taxes amounting to $25 on
their stock of goods, being void because of this unreasonable dis-
crimination, could not be given effect by disregarding the exemption
and exacting a license from all persons.
In the recent case of Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, Collector of In-
ternal Revenue, 7 where the Philippine statute known as the Chinese
Book-keeping Act, enacted to aid collection of taxes, prohibiting the
keeping of account books in any language except English, Spanish
or the Filipino dialects, was attacked as invalid as taking property
of Chinese merchants without due process of law; the court in reply
to the contention that what the legislature meant to do was to require
the keeping of such account books in English, Spanish or the Filipino
dialects as would reasonably enable the taxing officers to prevent and
detect the evasion of taxes, said:
"We fully concede that it is the duty of a court in considering
the validity of an act to give it such reasonable construction as can
be reached to bring it within the fundamental law. But it is very
clear that amendment may not be substituted for construction, and
that a court may not exercise legislative functions to save the law
from conflict with constitutional limitation."
P. J. RANSON.
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON VALIDITY OF ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
In a recent case' the Supreme Court of North Carolina had
its first chance to give an opinion on the nature of adoption
'United States v. Reese (1875) 92 U. S. 214, 221; Trade Mark Cases(1879) 100 U. S. 82, 98; Poindexter v. Greenhow (1885) 114 U. S. 270, 304,
5 Sup. Ct. 903, 962; Spraigue v. Thompson (1886) 118 U. S. 90, 95, 6 Sup. Ct.
988; Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. McKendree (1906) 203 U. S. 514, 27 Sup.
Ct. 153, 52 L. Ed. 298; Yu Cong Eng et al v. Trinidad et al (1926) 46 Sup.
Ct. 619.
"State v. Mitchell (1902) 97 Me. 66, 53 Atl. 887, 94 Am. St. Rep. 481.
'Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad (1926) 46 Sup. Ct. 619.
' Truelove v. Parker (1926) 191 N. C. 430, 132 S. E. 295, Stacy, C. J.,
dissenting.
68 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and the jurisdictional requirements for adoption under the North
Carolina statute.2 In that case J. A. Weathers filed a petition
before the clerk of the Superior Court which set out, inter alia,
that Irma Johnson is a child five years old, at present residing
with the petitioner; that her mother has been living away from her
husband and the child for the past two years and takes no interest in
the child; that the father of the child is not capable of properly pro-
viding for said child, and that he consents to this adoption. The
petition had the caption, "J. A. Weathers vs. L. J. and Martha
Johnson." This caption was followed throughout the various papers
in the proceedings. An order of adoption followed, signed by the
clerk, stating, in part, "This cause coming on to be heard upon the
allegations of the petition, and being heard, and it appearing to the
court that Irma Johnson is a child without any estate, and that
Martha Johnson, mother of the child, is living away from her hus-
band and child and takes no interest whatever in said child, and that
L. J. Johnson, father of the child is not capable of properly provid-
ing for said child and consents to the adoption of said child by said
J. A. Weathers, who is a proper and suitable person to have the
custody of said child, and who desires to adopt said child for life.
" The letters of adoption followed. These three papers con-
stitute the entire record of the proceedings.
Thereafter, for 10 years, Irma lived with J. A. Weathers as his
child, and no objection was made, directly or collaterally, to the
adoption proceedings. Then an automobile accident caused the death
of J. A. Weathers followed in a few hours by the death of Irma, the
adopted child. There being no lineal descendants, the collateral heirs
of J. A. Weathers, contending that the adoption proceedings were
void, now claim his property, and institute an action to try title to
the land against defendants who claim the title to the land of J. A.
Weathers through Irma.
The court held that the adoption proceedings were void and there-
fore subject to collateral attack. Arguing that the statute was not
complied with, the court states: "The parent or guardian, or the
person having charge of such child, must be a party of record in this
proceeding." As stated above, the record in this case, which consists
only of the petition, the order of adoption and the letters of adoption,
finds that the father consented to the adoption and that the mother
IC. S., sec. 182 et seq.
NOTES
"is living away from her husband and child and takes no interest
whatever in said child." The court finds that the statute is not com-
plied with for that "it does not affirmatively appear that the father
and mother of the child were parties of record in the proceeding."
This raises the question, is it necessary that the record contain
recital of service of process on the parents? The court answers this
question affirmatively and states that failure to do so is proof that
the court had no jurisdiction of the parties. But the statute does not
provide for process. "Upon filing of such petition, and with the
consent of the parents, if living, or of the guardian, if any, or of the
person with whom such child resides, or who may have charge of
such child, the court may, if the petitioner is a proper and suitable
person, sanction and allow such adoption by an order granting let-
ters of adoption."3  It seems that it was in the mind of the legis-
lature to vest a large amount of discretion in the clerk in this par-
ticular proceeding, and that his findings as they appear in the record
-and the petition, order and letters of adoption constitute the only
papers provided for in the adoption proceedings-should be taken to
be true. It is a well known rule that the record imports verity.4
There is no reason why this rule should not apply in adoption pro-
ceedings. But the court said, "In the order there is a recital of the
father's consent to the adoption, and from this, it is said, his appear-
ance may be inferred; but as the order purports to repeat and
approve each allegation of the petition, including that of the father's
consent, in the absence of any other suggestion of the father's pres-
ence or appearance in the proceeding, we may reasonably infer that
the clerk assumed the petition to be true and upon this assumption
adjudged the adoption without further inquiry or investigation."
This statement is in conformity with that line of cases which de-
dares that everything in an adoption proceeding which does not
affirmatively appear to be within the jurisdiction will be presumed to
be without the jurisdiction.5 But to rest the decision on an inference
that the clerk made no investigation at all in deciding upon the
adoption is doubtful. It is submitted that the opposite inference is
just as reasonable, that the clerk made a proper investigation and
" C. S., sec. 184.
' Conradt v. Lepper (1905) 13 Wyo. 473, 81 Pac. 307; State v. Berry (1925)
190 N. C. 363, 130 S. E. 12; State v. Wheeler (1923) 185 N. C. 670, 116 S.
E. 413.
'Ferguson v. Jones (1886) 17 Ore. 204, 20 Pac. 842.
70 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
was satisfied of the father's consent. The presumption should be in
favor of the clerk's action being proper.8 To say that it is reason-
able for a judicial officer to act not in accordance with the law would
place a serious impediment on all judicial action.
The court further says that the jurisdiction of the clerk is lim-
ited and special. This is granted; but standing on the premise that
the clerk must adhere strictly to the statute, it may well be argued that,
from the language of the statute itself, this record does affirmatively
show that the clerk had jurisdiction of the parties. No summons is
provided for, as in ordinary civil actions, but "upon finding of the
petition, and with the consent of the parent or parents, if living, or
of the guardian . . . the court may, if petitioner is a proper
and suitable person, sanction and allow such adoption by an order
granting letters of adoption."7  This is complied with. "When a
court has attained the dignity of a court of record, there is a pre-
sumption in favor of its jurisdiction, and the rightfulness of its
decrees, when it assumes to act, and, until it has attained such dignity,
it has no record by which it may speak at all. In the second place,
even if its jurisdiction be special in such cases, unless the statute
require some written evidence of its jurisdiction to be made and pre-
served, the general rule, respecting judicial officers, and courts of
limited authority, is that the jurisdictional facts, upon which their
decrees rest, may be shown by extrinsic evidence, oral or written, in
the absence of a statute requiring such facts to appear in the min-
utes or other record of its proceedings."8  The extrinsic evidence
here referred to was brought into the instant case to show that the
mother had been, for two years prior to the order of adoption, living
in adultery and away from her daughter "and takes no interest what-
ever in said child." This fact would dispense with her consent to
the adoption and would forfeit her right to "the care, custody and
services of the child." 9
The court cites 1 Ruling Case Law 603, sec. 11, in support of the
rule that nothing will be presumed in favor of the jurisdiction in
adoption proceedings. Stacy, C. J., questions whether this view is
supported by the better cases on the subject. Corpus Juris, on the
other hand, after stating that there is considerable conflict in the
lJossey v. Brovn (1904) 119 Ga. 758, 47 S. E. 350.
'C. S., sec. 184.
' Stacy C. J., dissenting in Truelove v. Parke& (1926) 191 N. C. 430, 445,
132 S. E. 295.
SC. S., sec. 189.
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authorities on this point, adds, "But the tendency of the courts is
away from this harsh doctrine, and the better rule would seem to be
that the adoption will be upheld against a collateral attack unless the
want of jurisdiction is affirmatively shown. The burden of proof is
on the person attacking the validity of the adoption where the pro-
ceedings are regular upon their face. Recitals in the order of adop-
tion of facts necessary to the jurisdiction of the court may not be
impeached in a collateral proceeding."'o
Adoption was unknown at common law; it is a creature of the
Roman law. Massachusetts was the first of the common law states
to permit adoption, that commonwealth passing such a statute in
1851.11 Courts have construed adoption statutes very harshly and
have justified their decisions by saying that such statutes are in
derogation of common law principles.12 But it is submitted that the
fact that these statutes have spread so widely is in itself proof of
their usefulness and calls for a liberal treatment by the courts to the
end that uncared for children may find homes.
Although the court decided the question upon the narrow ground
of the construction of the adoption statute, it seems that there is a
divergence between the attitude of the majority and minority as to
the essential nature of adoption proceedings. The majority speaks
of an adverse proceeding requiring personal service of process and
cites cases of other actions in personam as authority. The minority
speaks of an ex parte proceeding. The true nature of adoption is not
clear. Its purpose is to create the relationship of parent and child
between strangers. It is not to destroy the relationship between the
child and its natural parents. The child still inherits from them and
they from the child. But it does create a new relation of parenthood
and childhood, a status permanent in its nature. For a court to have
power to create such a status, the domicile of the child is the most
important jurisdictional requirement. The adopting parents are be-
fore the court with their petition and the court's concern is for the
welfare of the child who is domiciled in the state or county of the
forum. Of course, the statute must be observed, but in construing
it, the court should keep before it the essential nature of adoption
proceedings, which are more like proceedings in rem than proceed-
ings in personam. S. E. VEST.
I01 C. J. 1394, sec. 114.
"Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 Col. L. Rev. 332, 335.
"Kennedy v. Borah (1907) 226 Ill. 243, 80 N. E. 767; Ferguson v. Jones
(1886) 17 Ore. 204, 20 Pac. 842.
